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In an age where any digital image can be manipulated, studying how and why 
people trust images as well as how likely people are to endorse deceptive images 
has become a topic of increasing importance. But, how is it human beings decide 
whether they trust and image, or not? This article attempts to shed light on the 
cognitive decision space of trust by means of two experiments. The goal of the 
first experiment was to induce the dimensions underpinning decisions of trust in 
relation to images. The goal of the second experiment was to investigate the 
propensity for subjects to deceive with images in conditions of both high and low 
levels of deception. The first experiment revealed four dimensions that 
determined the level of trust in an image: the features of the image, its content, 
its source, and the participants’ own background knowledge. The second 
experiment suggests that there is propensity for human subjects to deceive with 
images. 
 
Introduction 
 
In an age where any digital image can be manipulated, studying how and why people 
trust images as well as how likely people are to endorse deceptive images has become 
a topic of increasing importance. Mapping the dimensions of cognitive decision space 
may shed light on how human beings decide whether they trust an image, or not and 
the propensity for human beings to deceive with images. A cognitive decision space 
framework provides tools to analyse, categorise and predict trust likelihoods for 
images.  
 
The framework draws on the methodological approach taken to map out the decision 
space regarding document relevance. Over three decades, qualitative studies have 
identified cognitive dimensions of relevance, which have exhibited an encouraging 
degree of inter-subjective agreement (Schamber et al., 1990; Barry, 1994; Mizzaro, 
1997; Borlund, 2003). For example, a recent study examined how users determined 
which list of search engine results (in the form of document captions) they preferred 
over another using five dimensions of relevance: “topicality,” (how well the caption 
was topically related to the user query), “freshness” (currency), “authority” 
(credibility), “caption quality,” and “diversity” (Kim et al., 2013). In this article, we 
focus on “trust” rather than “relevance”, using definitions of the concept of trust from 
scholars in cognitive science, archival and information science.  
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Trust, Images and Manipulation 
  
Trust is a philosophical ideal that has undergone many paradigm shifts over the past 
few centuries (MacNeil, 2001, p. 37). Trust implies a standard of moral certainty 
regarding how facts can be established as a result of empirical enquiry or reflective 
equilibrium. Judgement of trust is pivotal in the world of records where value is 
established because of the evidential aspect of records. Ensuring a high evidential 
value of records is the domain of diplomatics, which conceives of evidence as 
inference (MacNeil, 2001, p. 39). Diplomatics is a methodology by which documents 
(including text, images and multi-media) are evaluated to ensure that records are as 
trustworthy as possible. It is these ideas of records as evidence, and evidence as 
inference, that has largely	shaped the direction of recordkeeping during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
 
Outcomes from the Canadian-led InterPARES (International Research into the 
Preservation of Authentic Records in Electronic Systems) research projects  
concluded that trustworthiness of a record can be defined by three key aspects. These 
are “reliability”, “accuracy” and “authenticity” (Duranti & Rogers, 2012, p. 525; 
InterPARES, 2008; MacNeil, 2001, p. 40). An expansion of these terms identifies 
that: 
• Reliability is the trustworthiness of a record as a statement of fact and it is 
capable of standing for the action to which it attests. The reliability of a record 
can be ascertained based on the competence of its author, its completeness, 
and the controls on its creation. 
• Accuracy is the degree to which data, information, documents or records are 
precise, correct, truthful, free of error or distortion, or pertinent to the matter. 
This is based on the former and on the controls on the recording of content and 
transmission. 
• Authenticity is defined as the trustworthiness of a record as a record. This 
means that the record is what it purports to be, free from tampering or 
corruption. What the record professes in origin or authorship is genuine.  
Kelton et al.’s (2008, p370) model of trust in information comprises similar features: 
 
• Accuracy: the extent to which information is free from error 
• Objectivity: the balance of content 
• Validity: the use of responsible and accepted practices such as the soundness 
of the methods used, the inclusion of verifiable data, and the appropriate 
citation of sources 
• Stability: the persistence of information, both its presence and contents 
 
Donaldson and Conway (2015) conducted a qualitative study of user conceptions of 
trust of archival documents using Kelton et al.,’s model as a point of departure. One 
of the  premises of this study is shared by the present authors, namely, archival studies 
has “tended to treat the end user, when invoked at all, as the recipient of ‘propertied’ 
information, rather than as participants in the formation of trustworthiness”. 
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Trust in digital contexts concerns the three values of reliability, accuracy and 
authenticity and has been researched under the banner of ‘eTrust’ (Taddeo & Floridi, 
2011; Taddeo, 2009). In this research we ask: What are the dimensions underpinning 
decisions of eTrust in relation to images? The first point of note is that because digital 
contexts are less curated than traditional domains of record management, trust is 
defined against risk. That is, trust is accorded against the risk of not trusting, and the 
risk of trusting an untrustworthy or misleading source.  
 
Risk is intimately tied to honesty. The risk of a dishonest image is that it misleads the 
viewer with regards to what it represents, potentially causing harm via false beliefs. 
Professional photographers have been particularly active with regards to issues of 
eTrust and have proposed a universal ethical protocol. The hope is that an ethical 
protocol may contribute to the trustworthiness of images that are constantly seen in 
the media. For example, The National Press Photographers Association (NPPA) in the 
United States has a primary goal of, “the faithful and comprehensive depiction of the 
subject at hand (National Press Photography Association, 2012).” They see their work 
as having historic value and their values indicate that there should be no manipulation 
before or after the photo has been taken that could mislead viewers or misrepresent 
subjects. Nevertheless, though standards exist, there is no strict enforcement of their 
values. Often news agencies create their own sets of ethics for their photographers to 
abide by. The Los Angeles Times is one such example: their guidelines are more 
pragmatic than that of the NPPA and go on to detail exactly what adjustments are and 
are not acceptable. Any artistic renderings of images are to be clearly labelled “photo 
illustration” (Los Angeles Times, 2005).  If there is to be a universal protocol, then it 
has been proposed that there must be a definition of photographs under categories in 
the same manner in which texts are defined. This would place photographs into 
genres such as fiction and non-fiction, or editorializing and reportage (Roberts & 
Webber, 1999, p. 3). Within this it would be possible to use specific terminology to 
differentiate manipulated photographs from the untouched. While this could be an 
effective tool for live records, it does not help so much once those images are 
subsumed into the archives. 
 
It is from concerns regarding the edge of what is acceptable or not acceptable that 
reputed organizations with image archives such Getty Images (www.gettimages.com) 
and Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/) have a zero tolerance policy on photo 
manipulations (Lum, 2010, July 5; Lum 2010, July 19). A photographer who 
modified a golfing image to remove a background bystander was terminated by Getty 
Images in accordance with this policy (Lum, 2010, July 19). Similarly, a Pulitzer 
prize-winning photographer was fired after he had admitted altering an image of the 
conflict in Syria by photoshopping a camera out of the image1. In both cases the 
stance taken is that the image be a totally true and accurate depiction of reality 
regardless of how innocuous the alteration. Therefore, we define a decision on the 
trustworthiness of an image to be a decision on whether the image is an accurate 
representation of a situation, person or object. Naturally, much hinges on how 
accuracy is interpreted and where the subject sets the threshold for the image being 
“accurate enough”. For example, a subject might still judge the Pulitzer prize 
winner’s photograph as being accurate if they knew the camera had been 																																																								1	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2544662/Pulitzer-Prize-winning-photographer-fired-admitting-
doctored-Syrian-war-rebel-picture-photoshopping-camera-original-image.html	
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photoshopped out, simply because the object erased did not impinge on its 
resemblance to an actual war scene in Syria. Matt Carlson (2009) wrote that, “While 
photography’s fidelity to the real world has long been subject to speculation within 
both the academy and journalism, the diffusion of digital imaging technologies and 
software raises further questions concerning manipulation and alteration (p. 126).” 
The reality is that manipulated digital images are now an everyday occurrence, but to 
what extent are they deceitful? Deceit implies intent on the behalf of the photographer 
or the manipulator of the image, but there are varying degrees of manipulation, and 
different viewer reactions. In short, judgments of trust involve complex contextual 
factors that affect the perception and processing of images. 
 
Greenberg (2013) highlights two cognitive processes that are in operation when a 
person views an image: those that evaluate the content, resemblance and reference of 
an image and processes that evaluate the geometric and artistic depiction of an image 
with regards to reality. Because these processes operate implicitly and pre-
consciously, it is possible that they confound in some way if an image is ambiguous. 
That is, if viewers are challenged with regards to the content, resemblance or 
reference of an image, it might precipitate a challenge to the geometric or artistic 
representation of the image and vice versa. It turns out that visual fluency is an 
important factor. The concept of visual fluency is based on the principle that any 
visual stimulus requires cognitive work to process, the more work required, the less 
fluent the process. Cognitive work includes the evaluation of: content, resemblance, 
reference of an image; geometric and artistic depictions. Images that cohere with 
background beliefs on any of these factors are more easily processed than properties 
that surprise or confuse us. The amount of cognitive work is reflected in the speed and 
accuracy of visual processing as well as in the subjective experience of ease or 
difficulty of visual judgments (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Reber, & Fazendeiro, 2003). Factors such as blurriness (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2007) and contrast (Reber & Schwarz, 1999) can affect visual fluency. 
If the visual fluency hypothesis is right, then manipulated photos are less detectable 
the more they conform to largely unconscious rules of visual fluency. Interestingly, 
people are typically unaware why a given stimulus is easy to process, so their 
judgments can be manipulated. Ease of visual processing results in an illusion of 
truth, perhaps because perceptual fluency elicits a feeling of familiarity (Winkielman 
et al., 2003, p. 7)—and hence trust. As Shah & Oppenheimer (2007) note, “…with so 
much information available, how do we decide which cues to weight most heavily 
when we make visual veracity decisions?” (p. 371). 
 
When images include human faces, a slew of additional mechanisms come into play 
that might confound overall trust judgments of images. Rather than a judgment of 
accuracy, judging trust from facial appearance triggers basic approach/avoidance 
responses in social situations (Todorov, 2008). Facial trust judgments, like 
judgements of attractiveness, are an efficient heuristic to social decision-making 
(Willis & Todorov, 2006), that is, it only takes 33ms to discriminate between a 
trustworthy and untrustworthy-looking face (Todorov, 2008). Trustworthy faces 
correlate with features identified with happiness; where as untrustworthy faces 
correlate with features identified with anger (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008). 
Additionally, typical faces, evoking familiarity, are more trusted than atypical faces 
(Sofer, Dotsch, Wigboldus, Todorov, 2014). The effect of typicality on trust is found 
not only for faces, but also in music (Repp, 1997), colours (Martindale & Moore, 
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1988) and nonface objects (Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2003). Typicality research 
comports with the visual fluency research mentioned above where the more familiar a 
stimulus, the easier it is to process, the more positive affect created and the more 
trusted it is (Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro & Catty, 2006). It does not matter 
what sort of task one undertakes, processing fluency generates trust (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). 
 
Given the complexity of background cognitive processes which may confound 
decisions of trust, it is not surprising that in the few studies that have been conducted, 
human beings are not adept at making robust decisions about the trustworthiness of 
images. One recent study rated human subjects at being “poor to moderate” in their 
ability to detect manipulated images, and “poor” at identifying what part of the image 
had been manipulated (Caldwell et al., 2015). Given this difficulty in detecting 
manipulation, it is possible that the subject’s personality type might sway the decision 
one way or the other. For example, those with personality traits of openness, 
agreeableness or emotional stability may exhibit a propensity to trust images whilst 
those who are conscientious may be predisposed to be critical and have a propensity 
to distrust. It seems reasonable to assume that when the manipulation does not 
sufficiently disturb resemblance, that other factors may be employed in the decision 
making process. As noted above, “authority” (credibility) has been one dimension 
shown to affect decision space around document relevance. The source of information 
has also been shown to affect persuasion (Smith, Houwer & Nosek, 2013, 
Pornpitakpan, 2004). If the credibility embedded in a particular source has the ability 
to change people’s implicit evaluations, this could also be the case with trust. For 
example, if the source of an image is a reputed institution, the subject might be more 
willing to trust the image than if it was encountered on social media. Similarly, a 
journalist may elicit more trust than a blogger. Indeed, journalists are primarily 
perceived to have higher standards of credibility given the strict professional 
standards imposed on them, which is lacking in the blogging community (Davis, 
2008). Nick Denton, owner of a series of web blogs told the New York Times, ''I 
think it's implicit in the way that a Web site is produced that our standards of accuracy 
are lower''	(Bosman, 2004, Section 9, p. 10).  
 
Importantly, trust is not merely a cognitive phenomenon, but a sociological one too. 
The sociological aspect of trusting internet images is particularly acute because 
frequently images are not associated with reputational source such as Reuters or Getty 
Images, but appear de-contexualised to agents through anonymising sources such as 
image search engine results (e.g. Google image search), photo sites (e.g. Flickr), 
clickbait aggregator sites (e.g. Dose), or personal websites (e.g. Wordpress) without 
attribution. The anonymity of internet images removes relational aspects of trust that 
define ordinary social interactions (Cook & Gerbasi 2009). Removing intentionality 
from the images also reduces them to a Popperian ‘third world’, or ‘objective’ 
documents (Swanson,1986; Popper, 1972). Such images rely on an agent’s best-guess 
regarding accuracy and intention of the photographer/artist, and thus reduces the 
epistemic ‘benefit of the doubt’ that thrives with reasonable latitudes of interpretation 
between cooperative agents. Indeed, the very possibility of etrust under such 
conditions has been questioned (Nissenbaum, 2001). 
 
In addition to decisions of trustworthiness, there is the question to what degree 
subjects are willing to deceive with images. The classic example of this is where 
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blemishes are removed from personal photographs in order to make them look better. 
In addition, media outlets are regularly exposed in using images or videos to depict a 
story, but where these pertain to a like, but different event. This raises the question 
about what factors influence the decision threshold above which subjects are willing 
to deceive.  
 
With preceding as background, this article will present two experiments aimed at 
clarifying salient aspects of the cognitive space which frames decisions of trust in 
relation to images, as well as exploring the propensity of subjects to deceive with 
images. 
 
Experiment 1: Cognitive dimensions of trust 
 
The goal of the first experiment is to induce the dimensions that underpin decisions of 
trust in relation to images. A qualitative methodology was employed similar to studies 
which clarified the dimensions underpinning decisions of relevance. In addition, it is  
hypothesised that a reputed source accompanied with an image will produce higher 
trustworthiness ratings than a social media source or a lack of any source. We also 
predict that people high on scales of the personality traits of “openness”, 
“agreeableness” and “emotional stability” would be more likely to provide higher 
overall trustworthiness ratings, whilst those high on “conscientiousness” would 
provide lower overall ratings. 
 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 87 workers using the online crowdsourcing platform, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). This is a platform that enables researchers, 
amongst others, to post experiments and surveys in a form called a HIT (Human 
Intelligence Task) on a website available to thousands of potential participants to 
view and complete. Participants involved in the present study were able to view any 
HIT before agreeing to participate, and were paid a small amount (such as 50 – 60c) 
per HIT. AMT allows workers of a certain skill, ability or reputation to be specified 
for a HIT. In this experiment, workers of at least 95% or greater approval rating were 
selected to balance worker quality with the need to attract a sufficient number of 
participants. No demographic data was taken of participants, however, the general 
demographics of AMT workers are generally known. Around 50% are from the 
United States, 40% from India, and 10% from other countries (Ipeirotis & Panagiotis, 
2010). Workers using this platform are predominantly female if residing in the United 
States, and predominantly male if residing in India (Ipeirotis & Panagiotis, 2010). 
Because the experiments were presented in English, it was assumed that workers 
choosing to participate would be proficient in this language. Data collected from 
participants who did not respond to written segments of the experiment in English, or 
who were deemed not to have understood instructions based on the relevancy/quality 
of their responses, were excluded from the study. In total, 3 workers were excluded. 
 
Materials 
 
Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) developed by Gosling et al (2003) was 
designed as a short measure of the five-factor model of personality. The five-factor 
model stipulates that personality can be broken into five scales; openness to 
experiences, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability. 
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Participants were asked to what extent each item reflects how they see themselves on 
a 7-point scale. Each personality trait had both a positive and reverse-scored item, for 
example, the two items measuring extraversion were extraverted, enthusiastic, and 
reserved, quiet (reverse-scored). Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann (2003) found the 
measure to have stong test-retest reliability (r = .72) as well as convergent validity 
(mean r = .77). 
 
Images were obtained using a Google images search, and were freely available for 
use. All images used were chosen because they represented an unusual or unexpected 
depiction of the subject they portrayed. The group included a mix of digitally altered 
and unaltered images. The aim of image selection was to present images that were 
difficult to process due to their visual disfluency, therefore triggering a predisposition 
to distrust, whilst containing a mixture of geometrically 'real' and 'fake' images to 
assess how these influencers of trust interact. The following images were used, in 
order, a photograph of Russian President Vladmir Putin (unaltered), a photograph of a 
frill shark (unaltered), a picture of a man running from an explosion (digitally 
altered), a photograph of a mountain with an image taken of deep space by the Hubble 
Telescope superimposed in the background (digitally altered), and a photograph of a 
train derailment at Montparnasse Station in 1895 (unaltered).  Vladmir Putin, for 
example, is not often seen with a smile, and a frill shark is far from prototypical of its 
species. 
 
1. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
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Procedure 
 
Participants were instructed to peruse each HIT before agreeing to participate. Each 
HIT began with the 10-item personality questionnaire, followed by a definition of 
trustworthiness and a set of questions. The definition of trustworthiness given to 
participants was as follows: 
 
Trustworthiness can be defined as an accurate representation of a situation, person 
or object 
 
This was followed by 5 questions, each of which began with an image. Each image 
was contained within a red border and presented in the same order in each HIT. There 
were 3 experimental conditions; two contained sources underneath each image 
(outside the image’s red border), and one lacked any source. Of the two conditions 
assigning sources, one contained a source of social media origin (Facebook), whilst 
the other was a reputed source (either the Museum of Natural History in South Africa, 
or the Museum of Modern History in South Africa, depending on the nature of the 
image). Following each image was a question, which read: 
Taking into account the image itself, please indicate the level to which you 
judge the trustworthiness of the above image based on features inside the red box. 
 
This was followed by a Likert scale response system ranging from very untrustworthy 
(1) to very trustworthy (5) as well as a textbox asking participants to explain the 
reasons behind their decisions. After completion of the experiment, participants were 
given the opportunity to choose to submit their HITs. 
 
Analysis 
 
After all data had been gathered, qualitative data was coded using an axial coding 
method, with focus placed on themes of the features bearing on decisions of trust. 
Coding revealed four themes: 
1. Features of the image itself (e.g. “The person in the foreground does not seem 
to blend with the image in the background”) 
2. Content/Subject of the image (e.g. “All wild animals are untrustworthy. Also 
look at his teeth. He acts on instinct alone.”) 
3. Source below the image (e.g. “it is from a museum, so it seems to be 
trustworthy”) 
4. Prior knowledge (e.g. “Could be faked, but the auroras are spectacular and 
always look fake.”) 
 
The results of this coding were used to create the categorical variable, Decision Basis. 
The effect of this, as well as the condition variable on the dependant variable of 
trustworthiness score, were analysed using the GLM procedure in SPSS. The 
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influences of personality factors, as well as the effects of the experimental conditions 
on trustworthiness ratings were assessed using ANOVAs. 
 
Results 
 
A one way ANOVA revealed significant effects of type of source on ratings of 
trustworthiness for the following images: Putin, F(2,84) = 4.25, p =.017, frill shark, 
F(2,84) = 6.79, p =.002, and mountain and sky, F(2,84) = 3.13, p =.049. Contrast tests 
were conducted on significant main effects. Contrasts revealed a significant difference 
between the Facebook and Museum sources for the Putin, t(84) = 2.61, p = .01, frill 
shark, t(84) = 3.37, p = <.01, and train images, t(83) = 2.09, p = .04, with the more 
reputed Museum source yielding higher trustworthiness ratings than the less reputed 
Facebook source. However, this difference was not found for the mountain and sky 
image, t(84) = .93, p = .36. For the mountain and sky image the differences between 
no source and both sources were significant t(84) = 2.32, p = .02, as well as between 
the Facebook source and no source t(84) = 2.48, p = .02, but not the difference 
between Museum source and no source t(84) = 1.55, p = .13. Upon examining the 
means, this appears to be due to the fact that the Facebook source yields a slightly 
higher mean rating of trustworthiness than the Museum source, with no source 
yielding much lower ratings than either. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to find the effects of the basis of decision 
on decisions made on trustworthiness for each image.   
 
 
 	     Features	      Subject	       Source	
Prior 
Knowledge 
Putin	 14	 83.7	 1.2	 1.2	
Frill Shark	 28.2	 60	 2.4	 9.4	
Explosion	 63.5	 34.1	 1.2	 1.2	
Mountain	 51.8	 37.6	 1.2	 9.4	
Train	 38.8	 27.1	 1.2	 32.9	
Table 1 – Percentages of decision basis used by image 
 
There was a significant relationship between the answers that participants gave 
and the reasons they reported for those answers for Putin F(3, 82) = 11.86, p < .0001, 
frill shark F(3, 81) = 4.28, p = .007, explosion F (3, 81) = 3.09, p = .032, mountain 
and sky F(3, 81) = 11.82, p < .0001, and train F(3, 81) = 7.14, p < .0001. 
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Figure 1 – Means plots of trustworthiness ratings by decision bases. 
 
Chi Square analyses were conducted to determine whether certain answers were 
more affected by the subject of an image than others. To conduct this test, 
trustworthiness ratings were separated into ‘trust’ and ‘not trust’ answers by coding 
Likert scale responses from 1 to 2 to ‘not trust’ and 4 to 5 to ‘trust’. For the Putin 
image, 98% of the participants who did not trust the image had based their answer on 
the subject of the image, whilst this was only 52% in people who trusted the image. 
Participants were significantly more likely to refer to the subject of this image as the 
reasons for their trust judgement if they distrusted the image itself, c2(2, 86) = 26.90, 
p = <.001. 
All ratings of trustworthiness were averaged to create a total score of propensity 
to trust. This was significantly positively correlated with the personality variable of 
Emotional Stability t(1, 85) = 4.158, p=.045. 
 
Discussion 
 
There was a significant effect of source on participants’ ratings of trustworthiness for 
all but the explosion image condition. They all reflected that people generally trusted 
the museum sources over both Facebook and a lack of source. The train image 
showed only a significance between Facebook and museum sources, with no source 
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falling somewhere in between, showing that people trust Facebook even less than no 
source at all. These results were unsurprising, as we expected rational thought to 
conclude that a museum would present more credible source of images than social 
media. 
 
However, this was not the case in every image. In the mountain and sky image, 
participants were significantly more likely to trust the image given a Facebook source 
compared to no source at all. The same was not true for the museum source. This 
unlikely result could be due to the actual source of the image used. It was a 
photoshopped image that had been circulated in social media. It is likely that the 
familiarity of the image in that context may have elicited more trust than seeing it 
with a museum source. This provides an interesting avenue for future research in 
finding the degree to which context familiarity affects people’s trust in a sourced 
image. 
 
Despite participants’ apparently high reliance on source as a means to judge the 
images’ trustworthiness, their self-reports did not match this at all. Averaging across 
images, only 1.38% of participants mentioned the source of an image as a reason for 
making their judgement. This, relatively concrete, means of judging the accuracy and 
originality of an image appears to be left largely unarticulated, and gives way to the 
more abstract means of determining whether an image portrays an expected 
representation in the outward expression of a trustworthiness judgement. The majority 
of participants in this case appear to be making implicit judgements based on the 
source and alteration indicators for making trust/don’t trust judgements, however, are 
largely explaining these judgements by calling on more explicit challenges to their 
resemblance expectations of the subject of each image.  
 
Contrasts revealed that, in all images, decisions based on the source of an image were 
linked to significantly higher trust ratings than other bases of decisions.  In addition, 
participants basing their decisions on the subject matter of an image rated almost all 
images as significantly lower than other decision bases. The exception was the 
mountain image. The majority of qualitative data for participants choosing to base 
their decision on the subject matter revealed that participants were describing the 
aesthetics of the image. Speaking about prior knowledge was associated with 
significantly higher ratings of trustworthiness for the Putin, explosion and train 
images, but was linked with significantly lower trustworthiness ratings for the frill 
shark and mountain images. 
 
In the Putin and Frill Shark images, the most common reasoning given was the 
subject of the image, where most were distrusting the personality of Putin and the 
menacing-look of the shark. This relates to research on visual fluency whereby an 
untrustworthy subject (whether due to a known political past, or large set of teeth), 
eliciting a negative response (Todorov, 2008), may impede visual fluency, thus 
leading to a judgement of distrust of the medium through which this untrustworthy 
subject was brought – the image itself. This, coupled with the non-representative 
depiction of each appears to have led participants to substantially distrust both images 
simply because they distrust the subject portrayed in the image. This is a curious 
finding. 
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In the explosion image, comments regarding the features of the image take 
precedence. Participants were noticing the signs within the image that it had been 
manipulated, so it is unsurprising that this reasoning was most common when 
determining trustworthiness. The same was true of the mountain image, in addition to 
the high percentage of participants discussing the aesthetics of this image to judge 
trustworthiness. Over a third of participants used prior knowledge to determine 
trustworthiness of the train image, which appears to show participants who were 
familiar with the incident. Most of the remaining participants were split between 
speaking about the unlikeliness of the event portrayed in the image and features of the 
image indicating that it may be altered. Given the high incidence of participants using 
the features of an unaltered image to determine its trustworthiness, it may suggest that 
people search for errors in image manipulation to confirm what they may not believe 
the image portrayed. 
 
Speaking about prior knowledge was associated with significantly higher ratings of 
trustworthiness for the Putin, explosion and train images, but was linked with 
significantly lower trustworthiness ratings for the frill shark and mountain images. 
This appears to be due to participants often basing decisions on their unfamiliarity 
with a creature similar in appearance to the odd-looking frill shark. In the mountain 
image, participants rated trustworthiness as lower when they had seen the image 
before knowing that it had been photoshopped. The fact that basing decisions on 
source appeared to co-occur with higher ratings of trust could be due to a credible 
source overriding other possible untrustworthy contents of an image and thus 
determining the decision. This supports our quantitative findings that source 
significantly effects the trustworthiness ratings of images. What is interesting is the 
comparatively low incidence of participants discussing source as the basis for their 
decisions. This suggests that the source of an image does not need to be forefront in 
the mind to affect decisions of image trustworthiness. 
 
In terms of personality, it was found that emotional stability was positively correlated 
with propensity to trust the images. The only other personality measure that yielded a 
significant result was in the explosion image, where the more extraverted a person 
was, the more likely they were to rate this image as trustworthy. This could be 
because the stimulating subject matter appealed to extraverts more so than the rest of 
the images. This is supported by the finding that the degree to which someone likes 
something positively impacts a person’s trust in it (Doney & Cannon, 1997).  
 
 
Experiment 2: The propensity to deceive with images 
 
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the propensity for subjects to deceive 
with images. To this end, scenarios placed personal ethics in a tension with the 
severity of the deception. Ethical positions were established via roles: Journalist 
(assumed high ethics) vs. Blogger (assumed low ethics) and degree of purported 
deception with an image (high degree vs. low degree). 
 
We hypothesized that participants assigned to the role of Journalist would have a 
lower propensity to deceive than people assigned to be a Blogger in their decisions to 
use/not use each image. Additionally, we hypothesized that the propensity to deceive 
would be higher in the low deception condition regardless of the role. 
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Participants 
Participants consisted of 122 workers using the online crowdsourcing platform, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Participants involved in the present study were 
able to view any HIT before agreeing to participate, and were paid a small amount 
(such as 50 – 60c) to per HIT. As in Experiment 1, workers with at least 95% 
approval rating were recruited. No demographic data was taken from the participants. 
Data collected from participants who did not respond to written segments of the 
experiment in English, or who were deemed not to have understood instructions based 
on the relevancy/quality of their responses, were excluded from the study. In total, 2 
workers were excluded. 
 
Materials 
 
Images were obtained using a Google images search, and were freely available for 
use. The following images were used, in order, a photograph of the aftermath of a 
natural disaster in the Philippines, soldiers running toward a helicopter, tourists in 
front of Machu Picchu, and a mug shot of OJ Simpson, either original, or 
photoshopped. These images were chosen as they could be generalisable to each set 
of scenarios. 
1.  2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4a.       4b. 
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Procedure 
 
Each HIT began with the following instructions: 
 
For the following questions, you will be given a role and asked to explain what 
you would do in each situation. Please keep in mind this: It takes the photographer 
providing you with your photos 24 hours to produce each photo they offer to you. 
When you are making a living out of writing, you will be most successful if you are 
the first to publish a story, and you must be careful that rivals do not beat you to it. 
You must make each of the following decisions based on what you think you would do, 
along with the consideration of the time constraints present in your role-play 
occupation. 
 
This was followed by 4 scenarios, each of which contained a description and an 
accompanying image. The experiment was designed as a between subjects 2 X 2 
design. Two variables were created by manipulating each scenario. One variable was 
role, with half of the conditions requiring participants to imagine they were 
journalists, whilst participants in the other half were allocated the role of bloggers. 
The second variable was the severity of the deception of each image; high and low. 
Severity was manipulated by altering the description of the scenario. For example, 
one scenario asked that the participant imagine that they were a journalist (or blogger) 
writing about a typhoon in the Philippines. In the less severe deception condition, the 
scenario stated that the photo was “taken of the same typhoon, but when it was hitting 
a neighbouring country”. In the severe deception condition, the scenario stated that 
the photo was “however, taken of a different typhoon hitting the same area a few 
years ago”. 
Each scenario was presented in the same order in each HIT and was paired with 
an image. All photos were identical across all conditions, except in the last scenario 
concerning O.J. Simpson, where the severe deception scenario contained the fact that 
the image had been altered, and a photo-shopped version of the image was displayed. 
Participants were provided with a question after every scenario-image pair, 
which stated “This is the only image you have. Do you use this image?” This was 
followed by ‘yes’ or ‘no’ radio buttons and a text box asking participants to type the 
reasons for their decisions. 
 
Analysis 
 
After all data had been gathered, qualitative data was coded using an axial coding 
method. The results of this coding were used to create categorical variables. The 
effect of this, as well as the effects of role and severity of deception on decisions to 
use images, were analysed using Pearson Chi-Square tests in SPSS.  
 
Results 
 
No significant effects were found for either the role or degree of deception on the 
decisions participants made about the hypothetical use of images. A marginally 
significant effect was found in the OJ Simpson scenario where participants were 
slightly more likely to click ‘no’ to using the image in the severe deception condition 
than in the slight deception condition, t(1, 118) = 2.853,  p = .094. 
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Sixty-five% of participants in all conditions opted to use image 1, 59% for 
image 2 and 85% said that they would use image 3. By contrast, only 38% decided 
they would use image 4.  
As a result of qualitative coding, three themes emerged in which participants 
were basing their decisions; upon ethical considerations, compromise, or talking in 
terms of cost vs. gain. 
 
 	 Ethical	
Cost vs. 
Gain	 Compromise	
1	 34.1	 35.22	 30.68	
2	 42.11	 18.42	 39.47	
3	 48.78	 12.2	 39.02	
4	 43.89	 13.26	 42.85	
 Table 2 – Percentages of decision basis used by image 
 
A chi-square analysis revealed that whether or not participants talked about cost 
vs. gain had a significant interaction with levels of trustworthiness judged in the OJ 
Simpson scenario, c2(1, 120) = 8.53, p = <.01. When participants spoke in terms of 
cost vs. gain in their reasoning for their answers to this scenario, they were 
significantly more likely to decide not to use the deceptive image than if they did not 
talk about consequences. This was compared to no difference found when participants 
did not talk in terms of cost vs. gain.  
 
Discussion 
 
Across both deception conditions and roles, the majority of participants chose to 
deceive with the three images, with the result of the fourth image being reversed for 
reasons we will discuss below. This is perhaps suggestive of a propensity for human 
subjects to deceive with images. 
The lack of a significant result in the difference between roles could have been 
due to a variety of factors. (Smith, Houwer & Nosek, 2013, Pornpitakpan, 2004 & 
Davis, 2008),	suggests that there should have been an effect, and to say that our 
sample-size was simply too small, or that the role-induction was ineffective would be 
plausible as an explanation. However, people’s perceptions of the credibility and 
trustworthiness of journalists and bloggers appear to be more complex than we first 
anticipated. For example, Mackay & Lowrey (2011) found conflicting results 
investigating the effects of different types of journalists on trustworthiness, and found 
a greater effect in the attachment of journalists to a particular institution. There was an 
emphasis on political views in their experiments, so the perceived political ties of 
each media institution used may have accounted for part of the effect. Some of our 
images had political connotations and some didn’t. The fact that people may have 
been relying on different indicators to base the actions of their role may have 
confounded the results. In fact, Scholl & O’Hair (2005) found that a number of 
personal attributes and beliefs contribute to a person’s propensity to deceive, and, 
judging by how ingrained they are, it may mean that any superficial attempt at 
applying a role would prove futile in swaying these beliefs and may explain why the 
reasons participants gave were more indicative of the answers than the roles. 
Despite the logical conclusion that journalism would be perceived as more 
trustworthy given its heightened credibility, regulated professional standards, and 
strict accountability, the actual perceptions of the participants in this study may not 
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have reflected this. One study (Johnson & Kaye, 2004) shows that people who 
regularly use and interact with blogs tend to rate their credibility and truthfulness as 
considerably higher than that of traditional journalism. It is highly likely that the 
nature of the recruitment and participation of our participants, being exclusively web-
based, may be skewed towards a primarily blog-using sample. This may have 
minimalised the difference in credibility perceptions of bloggers and journalists, and, 
coupled with many participants not appearing to fully inhabit the roles they were 
given, rendered the effects of these roles ineffective. With this in mind, any future 
studies wishing to use journalists and bloggers as means to induce disparities in 
perceived trustworthiness should be mindful of the preferences towards online or 
traditional reporting of their participants, and possibly, may need to adjust their 
predictions accordingly. 
Correlations between participants’ answers and their likelihood to speak in 
terms of cost and gain were almost non-existent, except in the OJ Simpson condition, 
where the likelihood to discuss cost versus gain significantly correlated with decisions 
not to endorse the images. The fact that this only occurs in the OJ Simpson condition 
relates to the fact that people are less likely to deceive when the cost of being found 
out is greater (Gneezy, 2005). This makes sense in the context of the present study as, 
in this condition, the cost was designed – and perceived – to be greatest. The famous 
nature of the subject matter meant that a deception would be greatly more 
recognisable than in the other conditions where one would have to be familiar with 
the difference in flora in Asia, or the demographics of tourists visiting Machu Picchu 
to discover a deception in the same way people would by looking at the face or time 
of the OJ Simpson mug shot. 
Percentages of yes or no responses for Images 1, 2 and 3 revealed that 
participants were more likely to agree to using an image than not. This may have been 
due to the perceived non-seriousness of the deceptions in these conditions. However, 
even in the photoshopped level of the OJ Simpson condition, considering the 
recognisability of the deception as well as the fact that it had been manipulated for the 
purpose of misleading hypothetical readers, there were still 38% of participants 
endorsing the image. This further shows the tendency toward deception in endorsing 
slightly untruthful images that we saw in the earlier conditions is carried through – in 
albeit smaller numbers – to a dramatically misleading form of deception. 
 
Broader implications of findings of Experiment 1 and 2 
 
The dimensions of trustworthiness identified in Experiment 1 allow a comparison of 
user-centred themes of trustworthiness, which were induced from a qualitative study 
of archival documents (Donaldson & Conway, 2015). This study revealed the 
following dimensions: 
• Accuracy: believed to be free of error 
• Believability: the extent to which the information appears to be plausible 
• Coverage: completeness of the information 
• Currency: the degree to which the information is up-to-date 
• Objectivity: balance of content 
• Stability: the persistence of information, both its presence and contents 
• Validity: the use of responsible and accepted practices such as the soundness 
of the methods used, the inclusion of verifiable data, and the appropriate 
citation of sources 
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The following emergent themes were additionally uncovered: 
• Perceived authenticity: Is it fake? 
• Inaccurate information: conceptualizing documents as being trustworthy 
despite containing inaccurate information 
• Primary or first hand evidence: the extent to which the document is primary or 
first-hand 
• Document legibility or readability 
• Document’s perceived proper form. 
 
Although the preceding themes “coverage”, “readability”, “proper form” and 
“validity” relate to the information being in the form of a document, it is nevertheless 
possible to draw some comparisons with the four dimensions that were induced from 
Experiment 1 based on information in the form of images. 
 
Donaldson & Conway’s theme of “authenticity” relates to the “image features” 
dimension as the latter comprises the identification of areas of the image that look 
fake or suspicious. A contrast can also be drawn with the theme of “accuracy”, but in 
the case of images it is not freedom from error that underpins the decision but issues 
such as whether the image is deemed an “accurate enough” portrayal of the subject of 
the image. 
 
In both documents and images “believability” hinges on determining the plausibility 
of the content. Experiment 1 uncovered that in the case of images prior knowledge is 
an important component of that determination. 
 
An important and unexpected finding from experiment 1 is that the subject of an 
image has a considerable effect on the judgement of trustworthiness of that image, 
particularly if the viewer distrusts the subject. In some ways this finding is the 
converse of an aspect of the “validity” uncovered by Donaldson & Conway where a 
document would be regarded as trustworthy even if its content is inaccurate, or 
incorrect (i.e., untrustworthy).  In experiment 1, an image could be deemed 
untrustworthy simply because the subject (i.e., the content) of the image is deemed 
untrustworthy. If this finding is reliable, it has implications for using people to judge 
the credibility of images, as it appears that for some images the decision about the 
trustworthiness of the image is being confounded with a decision regarding the 
trustworthiness of the subject of the image. 
 
Findings from both experiments 1 and 2 represent a challenge to the cultural heritage 
sector.  They suggest that it cannot be assumed that digital images from or of their 
collections will necessarily or automatically be trusted by those viewing these 
artefacts.  Library, archival and museum advocacy and outreach programmes 
concentrating on increasing the visibility of collections by curating online exhibitions 
need to develop awareness of the nuanced and complex factors influencing user 
decision making about trust issues.  This is a particularly significant issue for the 
archival professional community given the critical nature of ensuring the 
trustworthiness of records (see, for example, Duranti and Rogers, 2012).  The findings 
from the two experiments suggest that it is overly simplistic to assume that by 
establishing a link with a cultural heritage institution trust will automatically ensue. 
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The relative trust accorded to journalists and bloggers also suggest that trust once 
accorded to established or traditional professions should not be assumed to be the case 
in today’s digital environment. This calls into question the extent to which it can be 
assumed that cultural heritage professionals (librarians, archivists, museum curators) 
will be automatically assumed to confer trustworthy status on digital artefacts.    
Overall, the findings suggest the need for much more research in this area, comparing 
for instance the impact of making collections available on different platforms.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article set out to explore the cognitive decision space for deciding the 
trustworthiness of images. The qualitative analysis from Experiment 1revealed the 
following four themes, which we put forward as corresponding to underlying 
dimensions of this decision space. This parallels research in document relevance 
which revealed dimensions such as  “topical relatedness”, “novelty”, etc.:  
 
• Features of the image itself (e.g. ‘The person in the foreground does not seem 
to blend with the image in the background’) 
• Content/Subject of the image (e.g. ‘All wild animals are untrustworthy. Also 
look at his teeth. He acts on instinct alone.’) 
• Image source (e.g. ‘it is from a museum, so it seems to be trustworthy’) 
• Prior knowledge (e.g.‘ Could be faked, but the auroras are spectacular and 
always look fake.’) 
 
Studies into the credibility of media have generally been divided into two areas, 
source credibility (concerning the individual bearing information) and medium 
credibility (concerning the wider entity through which information is broadcast). In 
the present study, the focus of experimental manipulations was on the latter form. 
Two sides of this form of credibility were addressed; media as institutions (museums 
versus Facebook as in Experiment 1), and media in terms of types of reporting 
medium (journalists versus bloggers).  The presumption here is that the new forms of 
media are less bound by the rules placed on the traditional, being born in an era where 
artistic licence is given greater precedence as entertainment. 
One of the stand out results of these experiments are that, even though there seems to 
be a different degree of trust between sources of distinct levels of credibility, the same 
distinction does not occur when asked to inhabit sources and transact decisions of 
trust. This suggests that the standards people place on others are disparate to those 
that they place on themselves. 	
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful to the InterPARES Trust (https://interparestrust.org) which 
funded this research.  
 
References 
 
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a 
Metacognitive Nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 219-235. 
doi:10.1177/1088868309341564 
 
	 19	
Barry, C. (1994). User-defined relevance criteria: an exploratory study. J. Am. Soc. 
Inform. Sci. 45, 145–159.  
Borlund, P. (2003). The concept of relevance in IR. J. Am. Soc. Inform. Sci. Tech. 54, 
913–925. doi: 10.1002/asi.10286 Bosman,	J.	(2004).	First	with	the	Scoop,	If	Not	the	Truth.	New	York	Times,	April	
18,	2004,	section	9,	p.	10.	
 
Caldwell, S., Gedeon, T., Jones, R. and Copeland, L. (2015). “Imperfect 
Understandings: A Grounded Theory and Eye Gaze Investigation of Human 
Perceptions of Manipulated and Unmanipulated Digital Images” in Proceedings of the 
World Congress on Electrical Engineering and Computer Systems and Science (ECSS 
2015) 
Carlson, M. (2009). The Reality of a Fake Image; News norms, photojournalistic 
craft, and Brian Walski’s fabricated photograph. Journalism Practice, 3(2), 125–139. 	
Cattell, R. B., & Cattell, H. E. (1995). Personality structure and the new fifth edition 
of the 16PF. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 55(6), 926-937. 
Coleman, S. E. (2007). Digital photo manipulation: A descriptive analysis of codes of 
ethics and ethical decisions of photo editors (Ph.D.). The University of Southern 
Mississippi, Ann Arbor. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. 
(304825651) 	
Cook, K. S., & Gerbasi, A. (2009). Chapter 10: Trust. In P. Hedström & P. S. 
Bearman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (pp. 218-241): Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Cooper, C. (2015). Individual Differences and Personality (3 ed.). London: Taylor 
and Francis. 
 
Davis, R. (2008). A symbiotic relationship between journalists and bloggers. Joan 
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University. 
 
Donaldson, D.R & Conway, P. (2015). User conceptions of trustworthiness for digital 
archival documents. Journal of the Association for Information Science and 
Technology, 66(12), 2427-2444. 	
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-
seller relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 35-51.		
Duranti, L., & Rogers, C. (2012). Trust in digital records: An increasingly cloudy 
legal area. Computer Law & Security Review, 28(5), 522–531. 
 
Eysenck, H. J. (1992). Four ways five factors are not basic. Personality and 
individual differences, 13(6), 667-673. 
 
	 20	
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic 
Review, 384-394. 
Greenberg, G. (2013). Beyond resemblance. Philosophical Review 122(2): 215-287 
Halberstadt, J., & Rhodes, G. (2003). It’s not just average faces that are attractive: 
Computer-manipulated averageness makes birds, fish, and automobiles 
attractive. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10(1), 149-156. 
InterPARES. (2008). InterPARES 3 Project: International Research on Permanent 
Authentic Records in Electronic Systems. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from 
http://www.interpares.org/ip3/ip3_terminology_db.cfm?letter=t&term=55 	
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In H. L. 
Roediger & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in 
honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 391-422). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Johnson, T. J., & Kaye, B. K. (2004). Wag the blog: How reliance on traditional 
media and the Internet influence credibility perceptions of weblogs among blog 
users. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 81(3), 622-642. 
Kelton, K., Fleischmann, K.R., & Wallace, W.A. (2008). Trust in digital 
information. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology, 59(3), 363–374. 
Kim, J., Kazai, G., and Zitouni, I. (2013). “Relevance dimensions in preference- 
based IR evaluation”, in Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Conference of 
Research and Development in Information Retrieval (SIGIR’ 13) (New York, NY: 
ACM Press), 913–916. 
Los Angeles Times. (2005). Los Angeles Times Ethics Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://media.trb.com/media/acrobat/2005-07/18479691.pdf 	
Lum, J. (2010, July 5). Controversy Crops Up Over Economist Cover Photo. 
PetaPixel. Retrieved from 
 http://petapixel.com/2010/07/05/controversy-crops-up-over-economist-cover-photo/  
 
Lum, J. (2010, July 19). Getty Photographer Terminated Over Altered Golf Photo. 
PetaPixel. Retrieved from 
 http://petapixel.com/2010/07/19/getty-photographer-terminated-over-altered-golf-
photo/ 
 
Mackay, J. B., & Lowrey, W. (2011). The credibility divide: reader trust of online 
newspapers and blogs. Journal of Media Sociology, 3(1-4), 39-57. 
 
MacNeil, H. (2001). Trusting records in a postmodern world. Archivaria, 36–47. 
 
Martindale, C., & Moore, K. (1988). Priming, prototypicality, and preference. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,14(4), 661. 
 
Mizzaro, S. (1997). Relevance: the whole history. JASIS. 48(9), 810–832. 
	 21	
National Press Photography Association. (2012). NPPA Code of Ethics. Retrieved 
May 19, 2014, from https://nppa.org/code_of_ethics 	
Nissenbaum, H. (2001). Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron. Boston 
University Law Review, 81(3), 635-664. 
 
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of 
five decades' evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 243-281. 
 
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 8(3), 338-342.  
Repp, B. H. (1997). The aesthetic quality of a quantitatively average music 
performance: Two preliminary experiments. Music Perception, 419-444. 
Roberts, P., & Webber, J. (1999). Visual truth in the digital age: Towards a protocol 
for image ethics. Australian Computer Journal, 31(3), 78–82. 	
Schamber, L., Eisenberg, M., and Nilan, M. (1990). A re-examination of relevance: 
toward a dynamic, situational definition. Information Processing & Management. 
26(6), 755–775.  
Scholl, J. C., & O'Hair, D. (2005). Uncovering beliefs about deceptive 
communication. Communication Quarterly, 53(3), 377-399. 
 
Shah, A. K., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2007). Easy does it: The role of fluency in cue 
weighting. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(6), 371-379.  
Sofer, C., Dotsch, R., Wigboldus, D. H., & Todorov, A. (2015). What is typical is 
good: The influence of face typicality on perceived trustworthiness. Psychological 
Science, 26(1), 39-47. doi:10.1177/0956797614554955 
Swanson, D. R. (1986). Subjective versus Objective Relevance in Bibliographic 
Retrieval Systems. The Library Quarterly: Information, Community, Policy, 56(4), 
389-398.  Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4308045 
 
Taddeo, M. (2009). Defining Trust and E-Trust: From Old Theories to New 
Problems. International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction (IJTHI), 2(5), 
23-35. doi:10.4018/jthi.2009040102 
 
Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2011). The case for e-trust. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 13(1), 1-3. doi:10.1007/s10676-010-9263-1 
 
Todorov, A. (2008). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 208-224. 
Todorov, A., & Duchaine, B. (2008). Reading trustworthiness in faces without 
recognizing faces. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 25(3), 1-16. 
	 22	
doi:10.1080/02643290802044996 
Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions making up your mind after a 100-
ms exposure to a face. Psychological science, 17(7), 592-598. 
Winkielman, P., Halberstadt, J., Fazendeiro, T., & Catty, S. (2006). Prototypes Are 
Attractive Because They Are Easy on the Mind. Psychological Science, 17(9), 799-
806.  
 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Reber, R., & Fazendeiro, T. A. (2003). Affective and 
Cognitive Consequences of Visual Fluency: When Seeing is Easy on the Mind. In R. 
Baatra & L. Scott (Eds.), Persuasive imagery: A consumer response perspective (pp. 
75-89). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
 
